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论  文  摘   要： 
 






第一章  文献综述  将经济学中的社会管制理论（即公共利益学说、追逐论
和管制经济理论）运用于商业银行监管实践，并逐一分析三种理论的观点及与银
行监管的结合。 
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ABSTRCT 
Many bank failures and three-time currency crises shows the inherent 
instability of the banking ,and also  exploses  the shortcoming of the single 
government’s supervision since the 1980s.It is that the government’s 
supervision can eliminate the collective’s irrational behavior due to the 
“Herd-instict”, but at the same time encourage the “Moral-hazard”. This 
article tries to find a way to enhance our banking supervision system by 
cooperating internal control 、  government’s supervision with market 
discipline. 
This article includes four chapters: 
    The first chapter    Theories of Banking Supervision    Apply the social 
regulation theory including the public interest theory 、the capture theory 
and the economic theory of regulation in economy into the banking 
supervision .Analysis the three branches one by one ,display their viewpoint 
and the application into banking supervision. 
 
The Second Chapter    Comment  on  Government’s Supervision and  Market 
Discipline   the negative effect of the bank failures calls for 
supervision ,While the single government’s supervision may lead to three 
faults:the moral hazard、low efficiency and effected by government’s hobby.At 
the same time,there is much advantage of market discipline,for example,the 
strength is strong、the way is agile and it can restraint the bad bank in time. 
Therefore,we should adopt market discipline into our banking supervision , then  
pointing out the market discipline is not perfect,there is also much 
shortcoming ,for example,it is unfourable for the steady of the financial 
system、it can possibly lead to the disorder bank failures and sometime it may 
lose effect. 
The Third Chapter     The Application of Market Discipline   We should 
adopt market discipline into our banking supervision, but , Is the condition 
sufficient? In this part,pointing out that the information discloure is the 
basis of market discipline firstly；laying out the ways of market discipline 
secondly；futhermore, we should creat the conditions for market discipline 
including strengthening the corporate governance 、 constructing perfect 
financial market system and essential withdrawing from the market system. 
The Forth Chapter   Thoughts on Enhancing our Banking Supervision System   
There is fault in government supervision, So we should adopt market discipline . 
while, market discipline is not perfect, then, How to supervise our banking? 
Neither government’s supervision nor market discipline is perfect. We should 
coordinate government’s  supervision、 market discipline with internal 
control ,producing the best effect. 
Keywords: Public disclosure; Market Discipline ; Banking Supervision 
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前          言 
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第一章：文献综述 
Chapter One:  Theories of  Banking  Supervision 
 
 
第一节  银行监管的理论分析 





一、公共利益学说（The  Public  Interest  Theory） 
也有经济学家称之为实证理论的规范分析（Normative  analysis as  a  

























































（三）信息不对称（Asymmetric  Information ） 































二、追逐论或捕获论（Capture  Theory） 
由于社会利益学说难以解释的困惑，经济学家对新的解释监管问题的理论进












































第二节  几种理论与银行监管实践 
Section Two  The Application of the Regulation Theory 
to Banking Supervision 
 























































































































了，银行业的发展都呈现出“监管 金融创新⇒ 更高层次的监管 新一轮的金
融创新”的循环状态。 
⇒ ⇒









20 世纪 90 年代的金融世界跌宕不安，金融风暴频发。1992—1993 年的欧洲
货币危机、1994-1995 的墨西哥金融危机都演化成了大规模的地区危机，国际金融
市场亦受其牵连。与它们相比，一家银行的倒闭，一国股市的崩盘都仅仅是小巫
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第二章：对官方监管与市场约束的评价 
Chapter Two: Comment On Government’s Supervision 







第一节  监管的误区——官方监管行为缺陷 













美联储于 1984 年大陆伊利诺斯银行陷入困境时采取了“大银行不倒闭(Too Big To 
Fall)”的政策，当时联邦存款保险公司不仅为 10 万美元以下的储户提供担保，同时









































三、政府利益偏好的影响（The Government’s Hobby） 
实施官方监管，可以通过制定监管政策、法规，也可直接要求银行提供信息，
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